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ABSTRACT 
 
 In December of 1966 the United States government decided to place a $375 
million atomic accelerator in the all-white, rural town of Weston, Illinois.  The small 
town was located 30 miles west of Chicago, within an affluent suburban county named 
DuPage.  Residents of DuPage were thrilled to receive the atomic installation because it 
would spark new economic growth in the area.  However, the National Committee 
Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) immediately protested the approval of the 
Weston site.  They opposed the site choice because of a documented history of racial 
housing discrimination in and around Weston.  In 1967, the NCDH hoped to utilize the 
Cold War scientific research plant as political leverage to abolish racial housing 
discrimination in suburban Chicago.  This study argues that the eventual failure of the 
NCDH’s Weston protest illustrates the limits of the federal fair housing policy changes 
during the late 1960s.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 8, 1967, Jack E. Wood, Jr., and Edward Rutledge, Executive 
Directors of the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH), 
traveled to Washington, D.C., to testify before the Joint Congressional Committee on 
Atomic Energy (JCCAE).  They went to the nation’s capitol with one goal in mind: to 
convince Congress to delay the approval of a $375 million atomic accelerator site 
selection in Weston, Illinois until the town’s history of housing discrimination was 
addressed.1  The small, farming village of Weston was located approximately thirty miles 
west of Chicago and was situated in the predominantly white suburban county of 
DuPage.2  To the local boosters, the construction offered a chance for their area to 
become “The Atom Capital of the World.”3  To the NCDH, however, the decision was a 
battle cry.   
Immediately after Weston was awarded the scientific research prize on December 
16th, 1966, the NCDH began to organize its opposition to the site’s approval.  They 
perceived that the rural site selection of the Atomic Energy Committee (AEC), by design, 
excluded Chicago’s large African American population.  Wood and Rutledge argued that 
DuPage County possessed a long and documented record of preventing African 
Americans the opportunity to purchase or rent homes.  Additionally, racial housing 
discrimination helped make the Chicago metropolitan area the most segregated city in the 
country during the 1960s.  To the NCDH, the culture of discrimination in and around 
Weston made the AEC’s site choice morally and socially unacceptable.  The NCDH 
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recognized that the preexisting levels of housing discrimination in the Weston area would 
prevent Chicago’s inner-city blacks from accessing the new federal jobs that would be 
generated by the new technological windfall.4     
Wood and Rutledge quickly realized that the Weston site approval process gave 
them an opportunity to stall the AEC’s selection due to a set of 1960s civil rights 
guarantees.  The NCDH believed that John F. Kennedy’s 11063 executive order of 1962 
and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act both offered the necessary legal tools to 
establish a fair housing requirement in all federal policies.  In their 1967 congressional 
testimony, the NCDH seized the new political momentum to argue for the establishment 
of fair and open housing in suburban Chicago.  They asserted that federal mandates 
forced the federal government to use its money and power to help create equal 
opportunities for racial minorities to obtain housing and jobs.  
At the time of the AEC site announcement, the NCDH believed that the 
government’s stance on awarding federal contracts to communities was 
nondiscriminatory.  However, their actions were anything but nondiscriminatory.  
Instead, the NCDH argued that the federal government was supporting decisions that kept 
the status quo by ignoring the efforts of suburban communities to keep racial minorities 
out.   
The written AEC site selection criteria, in accordance with Kennedy’s executive 
order and Title VI, expressed in bold language that the agency would only consider 
communities that were open to people of every race.5  During the site selection process, 
the AEC maintained that it would strongly consider “the climate of equal opportunity and 
nondiscrimination existing in the communities surrounding the six prospective sites.”6  
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The NCDH believed that the choice of Weston flew in the face of the AEC’s earlier 
assurance.  The region’s longstanding and visible record of discriminatory practices in 
housing led Wood and Rutledge to argue that, “Weston clearly fails to meet one of the 
major AEC site selection criteria for its atomic installation.”7   
Wood and Rutledge announced during the 1967 Joint Committee hearing that 
they would welcome the atomic site choice if the Illinois legislature adopted an 
enforceable fair housing law.  The NCDH hoped to the use the AEC’s earlier fair housing 
promise as a tool to open the suburban housing market to African Americans trapped in 
Chicago’s isolated ghettos.  Wood and Rutledge argued that the Joint Committee’s 
unconditional approval of the Weston site would “have the effect of fastening even more 
tightly the bands of discrimination, poverty and unemployment which now enchain 
nearly one million Negroes to the Chicago ghettos.”8  If Kennedy’s executive order, Title 
VI and the AEC site criteria were to be taken seriously, they believed, Congress held an 
obligation to use the Weston site approval process to open up the resources of the suburbs 
to Chicago’s African Americans.  Wood and Rutledge demanded that the final 
authorization of funding for the atomic research be postponed until Illinois passed a Fair 
Housing Law.   This study will argue that the ultimate failure of their attempt illustrates 
the limits of the United State’s fair housing policy changes during the late 1960s.   
 
THE MAJOR PLAYERS IN THE WESTON SITE PROTEST 
Wood and Rutledge were the constant driving force behind the NCDH protest of 
the atomic accelerator site choice.  Three years prior to the AEC site announcement, the 
two men would become the Executive Directors of the NCDH at a crucial juncture in the 
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organization’s history.  NCDH President Charles Abrams, a long-time activist for 
housing rights in New York, believed that in the mid-1960s the NCDH had an 
unprecedented chance to reform federal housing policies.9  Abrams became the President 
in of the NCDH in 1961, the same year John F. Kennedy was elected President of the 
United States.  Kennedy’s earlier campaign promises gave Abrams and the NCDH reason 
to hope that the federal government was going to start addressing the national trend of 
racial housing discrimination.  Eventually, Kennedy partially followed through on his 
earlier guarantees by signing a 1962 executive order, which required the federal 
government to ensure equal opportunities in all federally financed housing programs.10  
In 1964 Abrams’ hired Wood and Rutledge to help utilize the new civil rights 
commitment of the United States.   
Abrams’ chose Wood and Rutledge because of their impressive experience in the 
civil rights and housing field.11  Their expertise would immediately bring fresh 
perspective and new direction to the NCDH.  Perhaps even more important to Abrams 
and the NCDH, was the fact that Wood and Rutledge came to the job with a 
comprehensive knowledge of federal housing policies.  Their ability to understand and 
cooperate with politicians allowed them to exercise the new civil rights mechanisms to 
abolish discriminatory barriers African American’s experienced when trying to purchase 
or rent a home.      
Wood and Rutledge redefined the scope of the organization as soon as they 
assumed leadership roles in the NCDH.  Rutledge declared that the goal was no longer 
simply about abolishing housing discrimination.  Instead, he stated that the NCDH would 
now be focused “beyond the issue of discrimination per se to those broad social, 
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economic, and political factors which support and extend the ghetto walls.”12  Under the 
new leadership, the organization started to center its efforts on tackling the economic 
issues facing racial minorities in the mid-1960s.  The NCDH attempted to create more 
economic equality by convincing the federal government to use its influence to make the 
opportunities of the nation’s suburbs accessible to racial minorities.   
In 1965, the NCDH launched an aggressive and sustained nationwide movement 
for open housing in the nation’s suburbs.  Early in their tenure, Wood and Rutledge 
started this educational campaign to explain the significant impact of housing 
discrimination on the job opportunities for low-income racial minorities.  They argued 
that for racial minorities living in isolated ghettos, “geography was their destiny.”13  
Wood and Rutledge explained that if the economic opportunities of the suburbs were 
accessible to all races it could have the potential to alleviate the unemployment of those 
suffering in the nation’s inner-cities.14   
During the post-war period, the nation witnessed a frightening rate of industrial 
decentralization to suburbia.  As jobs opportunities moved to the booming suburbs, inner-
city residents were experiencing increased economic hardships.  Wood and Rutledge 
recognized the vital connection between jobs and housing.  They were alarmed to find 
that many non-skilled and semi-skilled jobs were out of reach for African American 
families trapped in the inner-city by racial housing discrimination.  To reverse the pattern 
of uneven development and segregation, they believed it was necessary to abolish racial 
housing discrimination in the suburbs.  In the mid-1960s, the NCDH demanded the 
enactment of an enforceable and sweeping fair housing law to allow African Americans 
to access the economic opportunities found in the suburbs.   
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As Wood and Rutledge took over as Executive Directors in the mid-1960s, the 
NCDH grasped some limited fair housing victories.  They planned to utilize the new set 
of legislative tools such as, Kennedy’s executive order and Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, to begin to break down the racial ghettos of American cities.  Over the course 
of the next few years, the open housing movement would become a crusade, as the 
NCDH now demanded the federal government follow through on the nondiscriminatory 
assurances expressed in the 1960s civil rights legislation.  
It was in the midst of the NCDH campaign to disperse the ghetto that the AEC 
site announcement was made.  The decision of Weston, Illinois provided Wood and 
Rutledge with an important opportunity to integrate Chicago’s suburbs.  They felt 
strongly that if they could persuade Congress to hold off on the final funding 
authorization it would motivate the Illinois’ legislator to pass a statewide fair housing 
law.  To sway the legislators from supporting the federal funding of the Weston site, 
Wood and Rutledge delivered a fiery testimony and many letters outlining the need for 
fair housing protections in the area.  They hoped to stall the Weston site approval by 
convincing the majority of the Joint Congressional Committee that the AEC site choice 
flew in the face of the new existing federal fair housing mandates.   
The influential arguments of the NCDH ignited an intense debate over the final 
approval for the atomic plant’s funding when it came to a Senate vote in June of 1967.  In 
the midst of the debate, a New York Times editorial articulated the mood of many 
Americans during a summer in which race riots erupted in Newark and Detroit and anti-
war protesters marched in Washington, D.C.  “The nation is engaged in a bloody war in 
Vietnam; the streets of its cities are swept by riots born of anger over racial and economic 
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inequities,” the editorial observed.  “It is a distortion of national priorities to commit 
many millions now to this interesting but unnecessary scientific luxury.”15   
 The Chairman of the Joint Committee, Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island, was 
one of the most steadfast opponents of the AEC decision and became the leading 
advocate in the congressional fight against the site’s authorization.  He spoke for the 
needs of many struggling northern cities and his opinions were supported my other 
Democratic senators representing the urban north.  Following Pastore’s lead, northern 
Democratic senators Walter Mondale, Philip Hart and Jacob Javits, were also passionate 
proponents of the protest against the AEC site selection.  They agreed that the federal 
government for many years had facilitated the existing pattern of segregation in the 
United States.  During the late 1960s, these Democratic senators argued that they had a 
moral responsibility to right earlier injustices by taking active steps to destroy the walls 
of discrimination between the nation’s cities and suburbs.  The liberal senators believed 
that the open housing ideology of the NCDH could help cool the mounting tensions in the 
nation’s cities.   
Pastore’s concern over the civil rights problems related to the Weston selection 
led him to invite the NCDH to testify to the Joint Committee.  He hoped that the NCDH 
testimony would convince enough of his colleagues that they needed to block the 
approval of the Weston site until Illinois passed a statewide fair housing law.  Pastore 
underscored the irony when he wrote: “in the name of advancing science and technology 
we should not be guilty of retreating from our boasted principles of equity, equality and 
humanity.”16 
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Not all of the politicians on the Joint Congressional Committee shared the 
ideological views of those senators who sympathized with the NCDH.  Support or 
opposition of the Weston site selection was largely decided along urban/suburban and 
liberal/conservative lines.  Republican Joint Committee member Melvin Price of Illinois 
was representative of the members who opposed the NCDH fair housing demands for the 
site.  He felt the rights of suburban homeowners in Illinois should not be infringed upon 
with a federally forced state fair housing law.  Price argued that the use of the AEC site 
as a “civil rights carrot” to award to states with strong open housing legislation was 
unacceptable.  He believed, like many other Republicans on the Joint Committee, that 
moral civil rights considerations should not be considered in the Weston site approval 
because the federal government did not have any precedent for doing so.  “Although we 
have located many atomic facilities in the past twenty years this question has not 
previously been raised,” he argued.17  
Everett Dirksen, the influential Republican Senate Minority leader from Illinois, 
was outraged by what he declared was “an evil precedent.”  Not only would his state 
suffer, but he also argued to protect the 29 other states that did not have fair housing 
legislation at the time.  During the final approval for the site, Dirksen delivered a biting 
and sarcastic retort to the Democrat’s efforts to block the Weston site.  “I’ll have a list 
and I’ll keep it handy, just wait until appropriations, authorizations for federal projects 
come along for these states.  The same standard will apply,” Dirksen declared.18  
Conservatives, like Dirksen, strongly asserted during the site approval debate that the 
Joint Committee could not inflict its moral authority on state and local governments.    
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Countering Dirksen, Pastore rejoined, “perhaps we are setting a precedent and the 
precedent will be that any time a governmental agency brings up the question of fair 
opportunity, they make that a predicate.”19  Democratic Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, 
a notable civil rights advocate, also tried to soften the fear over the creation of an 
unreasonable precedent.  He believed that blocking the funding for the Weston site gave 
the government an opportunity to right a previous wrong and practice what it preached.  
To Hart, the atomic site approval presented a chance to provide all citizens with equal 
access to good jobs, a decent home and a quality education.  Senator Hart’s statements 
reiterated the ideology of Wood and Rutledge.  Such aspirations for equal opportunity to 
jobs and housing in Weston would only become a reality if the Senate acted on the 
mandate of Title VI and Kennedy’s executive order.  Otherwise, Hart believed that the 
federal government “would have failed to take up the challenge of a future for citizens of 
our blighted urban ghettos.”20 
 
THE ORIGINS OF THE NCDH 
 
To gain a deeper understanding of the 1967 fair housing philosophy of Wood, 
Rutledge and that of the supportive legislators, a look at the earlier history of the NCDH 
is imperative.  The NCDH roots can be traced back to a local organization called The 
New York State Committee on Discrimination in Housing (NYSCDH).  The future 
President of the NCDH, Charles Abrams, helped oversee the creation of the NYSCDH in 
1948.  Upon its creation the organization consisted of sixteen local civil rights groups, all 
with the collective goal of ending racial discrimination in housing.21  The radical thoughts 
of Abrams would form the basis of the New York Fair Housing Committee’s ideology, 
which would also become the philosophy for its predecessor organization, the NCDH.  
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“If Negroes are integrated with whites into self-contained communities without 
segregation,” Abrams believed, “initial tensions tend to subside, differences are 
reconciled and cooperation develops–in short, an environment is created in which 
interracial harmony will be achieved.”22 
The New York Fair Housing Committee was created in response to the emerging 
housing crisis for urban African Americans, during one of the largest racial demographic 
shifts in United States history.   In the Second Great Migration, occurring after World 
War II, a total of 1.5 million African Americans moved from the rural south to the 
nation’s northern cities.  The demographic shift was one of the largest population 
movements of the twentieth century and rapidly changed the racial makeup of the urban 
north.23  Like the first movement of southern blacks northward during World War I, the 
second wave of the African American Great Migration increased the level of tension and 
violence between whites and racial minorities who attempted to buy and occupy housing 
in the urban north.24   It was in this historical context that the NCDH emerged to address 
the escalation of racial segregation in the urban north. 
As African American’s increasingly moved into northern cities, whites just as 
quickly relocated to the suburbs under the banner of their collective whiteness.  Whites 
were able to flee the nation’s cities with the help of federal mortgage assistance 
programs.  Home ownership programs, such as the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) loans, were put in place during the New Deal 
era.  The FHA and the VA provided low-interest, long-term loans to whites, allowing 
millions of Americans to become new homeowners.25  The government subsidized loans 
expanded housing construction to unprecedented levels in the excitement of borrowing 
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and building.  However, African Americans found it increasingly difficult to get in on the 
housing boom provided by lower interest rates, often finding their neighborhoods were 
“redlined,” from being eligible.26 
The mass suburbanization of whites and the ghettoization of blacks was one of the 
most profound population shifts of the twentieth century.  In American Apartheid, 
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton provide strong evidence of how post-war federal 
housing policies contributed significantly to the decline of the inner-city by encouraging 
the selective out-migration of middle-class whites to the suburbs.27  Migrant African 
Americans’ hopes for achieving equality often went unrealized, as they found a de facto 
segregation system in the urban north that enforced the color line just as effectively as its 
de jure southern counterpart.   
In the late 1940s, Charles Abrams declared that federal housing policies were 
effectively containing African Americans by their race in the ghettos of American cities.  
He observed that the results of federal housing policies effectively concentrated the poor 
in central cities and dispersed the affluent to the suburbs.  It was abundantly clear to 
Abrams and his fellow fair housing activists that New Deal reforms encouraged and 
facilitated private home ownership for white families while leaving black families 
behind.28   
The year that the NYSCDH was founded was a significant one for fair housing 
reform.  The Shelley v. Kraemer decision in May of 1948 prohibited neighborhood 
property owners from refusing to sell or rent to ethnic and racial minorities.  This gave 
civil rights activists, such as Abrams, the momentum they had been waiting for.  The 
NYSCDH was quickly created in order to use the weight of the Shelley decision to attack 
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the institutional racism of the FHA on the local, and soon the national level.  Open 
housing advocates hoped that with concerted action they could abolish residential 
segregation once and for all.29  However, their initial optimism turned to disappointment, 
as the Shelley decision failed to prevent the FHA from underwriting mortgages 
containing racial covenants.  After 1948, the FHA continued to encourage the growth of 
suburbs, which still blocked African American home ownership, by refusing to provide 
loans to racially mixed neighborhoods. 
It did not take long for the NYSCDH to expand its scope to the national level.  
The Housing Act of 1949 sparked the need for a national committee for fair housing.  
When the federal government adopted the Housing Act of 1949 it created an 
unprecedented opportunity to reshape cities by race through a system of grants for major 
federal funding of local urban redevelopment projects.  The New York open housing 
advocates quickly realized the need to create a larger organization to pressure the federal 
government to integrate the nation’s cities.   
Quickly after the Housing Act of 1949 was accepted, the NYSCDH decided to 
hold a national conference to brainstorm ways in which it could influence and reform the 
new federal urban renewal policies.  At the conference, a group of New York fair housing 
activist decided to create a national committee to undo the legacy of discrimination in the 
nation’s suburbs and cities.  Thus, the National Committee Against Discrimination in 
Housing (NCDH) was officially formed in June of 1950.  The members were united in 
purpose; unanimously agreeing the NCDH should “provide a mechanism for the pooling 
of national and local organization resources.”30  The NCDH was created with the intent 
of maintaining a limited role, stating “it would be unwise for the new group to assume 
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functions which might leave the organization open to jurisdictional disputes.”  The 
members also decided that the mission of the NCDH program “should be one of action 
primarily and research secondarily.”31  
The initial national headquarters of the NCDH consisted of a tiny, ten feet by 
fifteen feet office, which also served as the office for the earlier NYSCDH.32  The 
organization started out as a modest independent research committee.  In 1950, the fair 
housing committee was made up of fifteen national labor, religious and civil rights 
groups, all working towards the goal of open housing.33  These organizations sought to 
use their collective strength to transform the direction of federal and local housing 
policies.  In doing so, the NCDH hoped it could begin to break apart the nation’s racial 
ghettos and spark real change in the segregated conditions of society.34 
 
1950s: NCDH EFFORTS TO TEAR DOWN THE WALLS OF DISCRIMINATION 
From its conception in the early 1950s, the NCDH gradually grew into somewhat 
of a social movement.  The organization brought a variety of interest groups together to 
engage in a direct action protest against federal and local housing policies that promoted 
segregation.  The NCDH sought to accomplish a nation-wide, open housing market by 
removing restrictions based on race, creed, and national origin.  For the next few decades, 
it would be the only national agency working in civil rights field that focused exclusively 
on fair housing issues.   
In addition to its direct action protest of the 1950s, the NCDH attempted to reform 
the segregated conditions of the United States by exposing the reality of racial 
discrimination in housing markets.  By informing the public of the benefits of 
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desegregated housing, the organization hoped to break down the barriers racial minorities 
encountered when trying to move into white residential areas.  Research was a primary 
focus as well as providing legal assistance to those ready to challenge discrimination in 
the housing market.  Another important mission of the NCDH was their publication of 
newsletters and reports.  For instance, the bi-monthly publication Trends in Housing was 
an important way for the NCDH to spread the word about issues related to the open 
housing struggle.  The most important objective of the NCDH, however, was to place 
constant pressure on the Housing and Home Financing Agency (HHFA) and the Public 
Housing Authority (PHA) to change racial policies on open occupancy and racial 
integration.35      
After the NCDH was created its predominant focus was on reforming the new 
federal housing policies adopted after the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954.  These two 
Housing Acts dramatically reshaped the relationship of the federal government with the 
nation’s cities.  For instance, the passage of the Housing Act of 1949 created the Public 
Housing Administration (PHA) to oversee a quickly growing public housing program.  
The PHA would construct 810,000 public housing units in six years.  Suburban historian, 
Kenneth Jackson describes that “the result, if not the intent of the public housing program 
was to segregate the races, to concentrate the disadvantaged in the inner cities and 
reinforce the image of suburbia as a place of refuge.”36  The Housing Act of 1949 also 
provided funds for massive urban redevelopment programs in American cities, providing 
municipalities with the funds to clear slums and make way for new growth.  Five years 
later, the passage of the Housing Act of 1954 enabled the Eisenhower administration to 
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provide municipal government’s with a staggering amount of money in order to reshape 
their cities along racial lines.    
The National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) was a key lobbying 
force behind the new Housing Acts, because their enactment established the legal and 
political tools for local real estate interests to designate and clear poor urban 
neighborhoods.  The NCDH believed that the invested interest of the NAREB in the the 
passage of the legislation came from their desire to further restrict the mobility of African 
Americans while increasing housing opportunities for whites.  Charles Abrams 
understood that “homeowners, home-builders, and mortgage-lenders seemed convinced 
that people should live only with their own kind, that the presence of a single minority 
family destroys property values and undermines social prestige and status.”37  Abrams’ 
believed that this ideology had become the post-war “gospel” of both local and national 
policy makers who were making racial discrimination and neighborhood congruity an 
official order.  The NCDH identified that the intentional and enduring efforts of the real 
estate industry were clearing out African American neighborhoods in the name of 
progress.  During the urban renewal process, many cities were using public housing and 
slum clearance funds as oppressive devices for segregating people based on race and 
class.38     
The NCDH waged an all out attack on urban renewal policies.  As watch dogs 
they were quick to see how the federal housing policies created by the Housing Acts of 
1949 and 1954, were critically reducing the supply of low-rent housing.  The NCDH 
constantly vocalized their disdain for the federal government’s discriminatory housing 
policies during the 1950s.  They argued that the passage of the 1949 and 1954 Housing 
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Acts began to critically reduce the supply of low rent housing in the nation’s cities.  
During the implementation of these acts the nation witnessed a net loss of 51,000 low 
rental units.  The NCDH argued that racial minorities, who made up two-thirds of those 
displaced, were forced into overcrowded ghettos because of restricted housing market 
and high prices.   
The implementation of the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts led the NCDH to declare 
that the federal government must stop utilizing its money and power to help local 
municipalities segregate neighborhoods by race.  They explained that the new federal 
housing policies financed the displacement of African Americans’ while also limiting 
their mobility through discriminatory lending practices.   The NCDH understood that the 
government was fostering and perpetuating a pattern of unequal and segregated 
development within cities and suburbs in the north.  In the early days of the organization, 
the NCDH strongly criticized Eisenhower’s public housing and urban renewal programs 
because they were being utilized to create the racial isolation of blacks in inner cities.   
In the 1950s, the federal government’s role in the development of city’s expanded 
significantly.  The new Housing Acts allowed the federal government to finance local 
government’s creation of spatial separation between races: African Americans in cities, 
whites in suburbs.  During the New Deal era the federal government began to limit 
African Americans’ mobility by supporting the politics of racial “containment” that 
defined the Cold War era.39  It was clear that the policies of slum clearance, urban 
renewal and the creation of public housing were being used as tools for “Negro removal.”  
These mechanisms were helping to establish a hard and fast pattern of racially 
segregation on a city/suburb divide.  The NCDH constantly focused on preventing the 
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Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 from supporting and reinforcing the spread of residential 
segregation.  The organization’s attempts at reform were largely unsuccessful as patterns 
of segregation and uneven development continued throughout the decade. 
1954 was another significant year for the NCDH.  In May of that year the Brown 
v. Board of Education of Topeka decision outlawed “separate but equal.”  Along with the 
Supreme Court ruling came cautious optimism for fair housing activist that federal 
housing policies would begin to help establish residential integration.  Frank Horne, the 
Director of the Racial Relation Services (RRS) and a founding member of the NCDH, 
believed that the Brown decision provided the opportunity for the Eisenhower 
administration to remove all racial restrictions in the housing market.  However, Horne 
and his fellow NCDH members were extremely disappointed in the years that followed 
Brown, as a federal housing policy of “separate but adequate” continued to be enforced.40   
It quickly became apparent that Eisenhower’s housing program would continue to 
ignore any policy changes resulting from the Supreme Court’s ruling of “separate but 
equal is inherently unequal.”41  In more vivid language, urban historian Arnold Hirsch 
captures the Eisenhower approach to the housing crisis as, “the popular image of a white 
suburban noose looping around a black-occupied core.”42  In 1955 the NCDH charged 
that, “federal, state and local authorities all bear the responsibility of seeing to it that 
public funds should not be used to perpetuate discriminatory housing policies.”43  The 
Brown decision ultimately did nothing to change urban renewal and public housing 
policies from being used as both national and local footholds for segregation and 
inequality.  To address the failures of Brown at abolishing racial housing segregation, the 
NCDH began lobbying for a federal executive order in 1956 to ban discrimination in 
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publicly supported housing.  Eisenhower would repeatedly ignore their efforts in the 
remaining years of his second term.   
 
1960s: A NEW ERA FOR THE NCDH 
By the early 1960s the growing influence of the NCDH aided in the passage of 
some new federal fair housing legislation.  An increased level of interest and compassion 
for the issue of racial discrimination in housing gave the NCDH a major boost in funding 
as well.  The increased funding led to the rapid growth of the organization during the 
1960s.  By 1964 the organization expanded from its original fifteen members to include 
forty-six interracial and civil right organizations, including all of the national civil rights 
organizations.44   
In February of 1967, the same month Rutledge and Wood spoke before the Joint 
Committee, the NCDH released a blistering report titled “How the Federal Government 
Builds Ghettos.”  Wood and Rutledge’s testimony would reference many conclusions of 
that report.  In strong and scornful language, the report accused federal policy of 
continuing to foster geographical racial segregation between white suburbs and African 
American ghettos.  Their scathing analysis outlined the ways in which the federal 
government facilitated racial segregation (both directly and indirectly) during the New 
Deal era.  It concluded that the federal government was “primarily responsible for 
undergirding a ghetto system that dominates, distorts and despoils every aspect of life in 
the United States today.”45 
Throughout the post-war period, the placement of government jobs in the suburbs 
was furthering unequal opportunities between white suburbanites and African American 
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city dwellers.  Federal agencies such as the AEC were overwhelmingly locating 
government jobs in middle-class suburbs rather than in urban areas.  New opportunities 
for federal government employment were often made inaccessible by housing 
discrimination against racial minorities.  “The growth policies of New Deal liberalism 
and the emergence of the Cold War military-industrial complex shaped the spatial 
patterns of development in the postwar suburbs,” states urban historian Matthew 
Lassiter.46  The NCDH charged that housing discrimination prevented African Americans 
from accessing the new federal jobs at a level equal to whites.   
Cold War politics considerably increased the amount of spending on civil defense 
and federal scientific research programs.  Between 1945 and 1970, a massive industrial 
complex developed by Cold War military spending transformed the United States.  
Federal incentives and tax policy aimed to promote suburban areas for new military and 
scientific installations.  New communities were being built in the urban periphery around 
various scientific research plants during the early decades of the Cold War.  The rise of 
“cities of knowledge,” as historian Margaret Pugh O’Mara has called them, moved 
economic activity away from the central cities.47  In the decades following World War II, 
federal scientific research spending was turning quiet agricultural areas like Weston, 
Illinois, into booming and elite suburbs.  These “cities of knowledge” were systematically 
cut off from the urban poor by the elimination of affordable housing through the zoning 
code and racial discrimination.   
The suburban placement of jobs was a major contributing factor to a long period 
of urban decline.  The lack of low and moderately priced suburban housing, combined 
with loan practices that controlled suburban growth, meant that African Americans could 
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not easily move to federal employment sites, ensuring unequal opportunities for federal 
jobs. 48  The increased anger and hostility African Americans’ experienced from white 
homeowners during this economic crisis would become extremely visible in a series of 
violent race riots occurring in United State’s cities like Watts and Detroit during the mid-
1960s. 
The lobbying efforts of the NCDH and the commodity race riots during the 1960s, 
made it clear that racial discrimination in housing was real and preventing the nation 
from achieving the goals of integration and equality.  The shift in federal policy during 
this period was largely due to the pressure of civil rights groups and an increased 
awareness of housing discrimination against African Americans.  At long last the fair 
housing movement was realizing some of its objectives and was slowly becoming a 
national political trend.   
President Kennedy’s 1962 executive order was one of the first and most 
significant fair housing victories that the NCDH obtained.  At the same time, the 
executive order disappointed the NCDH because it was limited in scope, only covering 
housing that would be built in the future.  It was a partial order that provided for housing 
built or bought with federal aid or financed by private mortgages guaranteed or insured 
by federal agencies.  The order left much of the nation’s housing stock uncovered 
because independent banks and savings and loans with federally insured deposits were 
exempt.  Another major flaw to the implementation of the law was that it did not provide 
any way to enforce the legislation.  While Kennedy’s executive order was limited and 
difficult to enforce, the spirit of the legislation would be open to a broader interpretation 
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by the NCDH.  The order did state that it prohibited discrimination in all federally 
assisted private housing.   
The 1962 fair housing victory was bolstered by the passage of Title VI within the 
1964 Civil Act.  Title VI prohibited racial discrimination in federal housing and created 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  The NCDH was not 
satisfied with Title VI because it still did not forbid discrimination in every federal 
program.  The NCDH explained that the legislation would exclude programs of insurance 
or guarantee, thus exempting nondiscrimination in the sale of private homes obtained 
with a FHA or VA mortgage.  Like its predecessor, Kennedy’s executive order, the 
enforcement of Title VI was ineffective, largely because HUD officials continued to 
transfer authority to local officials.  With no real enforcement mechanisms, whites 
continued to resist any kind of open occupancy in the private market and in public 
housing.   However, the passage of Title VI created another important declaration by the 
federal government that they would play a part in abolishing racial housing 
discrimination.49 
Title VI and Kennedy’s executive order marked a dramatic change in the 
relationship between federal policy and metropolitan development.  After three decades 
of federal policy that helped to establish racially segregated neighborhoods, some federal 
officials began to declare their commitment to open occupancy and the promotion of fair 
housing.  The 1960s guarantees gave the NCDH new mechanisms and momentum to 
force the federal government to reverse the tide of housing discrimination that they 
facilitated for so many years in the post-war era. 
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RESISTANCE OF WHITE HOMEOWNERS TO THE GOALS OF THE NCDH 
As the open housing movement demands grew louder, a heated and emotional 
reaction emerged from white suburban homeowners.  The intrusion of African Americans 
into their suburban communities was seen as a threat to their personal and financial 
security.  Suburban historian Becky M. Nicolaides states, “If they laid a claim to any 
right, it was that of owning a home and ensuring that this ownership would be 
protected.”50  Whites fought to protect their property values by preaching about the 
sanctity of local suburban governments and against the corruption of encroaching urban 
African Americans.  The fear of racial transition in their communities helped create a 
housing market that demanded residential segregation and the belief that the government 
did not have any business interfering with this market by forcing integration on whites.51 
While the New Deal’s policies had been liberal in many respects, they still 
retained many racist assumptions.  The housing and finance industry of the FHA, for 
example, effectively operated on segregationist premises and taught whites valuable 
lessons about what their privilege awarded to them.  The New Deal programs trained 
whites to invest in a philosophy regarding race and property.  Suburban historian David 
Freund summarizes that “a theory about property value and race was codified by ‘urban 
experts,” planners, academics, municipal officials, federal housing officials and published 
their findings.”52  White suburbanites would embrace the ideology of the New Deal 
housing reforms and mobilized politically to restrict their neighborhoods from nonwhites.   
By the 1960s however, the new liberals began to revise their views on race, a 
change that angered many whites.  Many suburbanites were extremely concerned about 
federal fair housing intervention in their communities.  The civil rights programs of the 
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1960s and the integration philosophy of the NCDH seemed to be aimed at undermining 
their quality of life.  Democrats who supported fair housing were starting to earn the 
reputation amongst blue-collar whites as an elite minority that was suppressing the 
interests of the majority.  The new liberal housing and civil rights reforms galvanized the 
white working-class to politically organize as a collective group on a national level.  
During the late 1960s white working-class politics broke free from the Democratic Party 
and form an organized “conservative backlash” to resist forced racial and economic 
change.53  
Recent scholarship on post-war suburbanization has closely examined the roots of 
suburban homeowner’s post-war politics and by doing so has traced the origins of a 
rightward turn in their politics of independence.  A group of “new suburban historians” 
has repeatedly argued that property ownership was the central way many United State’s 
suburbanites collectively identified in the twentieth century.54  These accounts have 
demonstrated that the creed of property rights and the political engagement it encouraged 
would become the source behind the 1960s conservative movement and the 1970s tax 
revolts.  Furthermore, they have argued that suburban homeowners believed that their 
restrictive politics were not driven by racism but rather by recognition that racial 
integration threatened the “free market” for their property and the integrity of the local 
governments.  In the post-war era, white’s understood all too well the political lessons 
about the relationship between property, racial privilege, and political rights.55 
In affluent suburbs like DuPage County, where the atomic accelerator site was 
located, residents also latched onto a philosophy of class exclusion.  By the late 1960s, 
new fair housing laws meant that class discrimination would become the successor tool 
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for the practice of state-sponsored residential segregation.  The protection of class 
privileges of affluent suburbanites consistently blocked the issue of racial integration 
from their communities.  Instead, threats of integration were passed over to working-class 
white communities such as Cicero, where the bloody race riots of 1951 took place.56  
Suburban historian Kenneth Durr has explained that blue-collar whites, like those living 
in the Chicago suburb of Cicero, were ever more "preoccupied with community 
boundaries...because they were not segregated by sheer wealth."57  These residents 
believed that the objectives of liberalism were not going to protect the security of their 
jobs, the worth of their neighborhoods, or the quality of their lives.  Out of a fear of 
integration and the negative economic effect it would bring to their communities, the 
white working-class was able to organize a strong and effective counter-attack to the 
political efforts of the NCDH.  In the late 1960s, legislators who sought to reform 
discriminatory housing policies were left to face the political wrath of working-class 
constituents who no longer trusted the Democratic Party. 
 
CHICAGO’S 1966 FAIR HOUSING PUSH 
It was not just white homeowners who resisted the goals of integration.  The open 
housing movement would also encounter stiff opposition from urban and suburban 
African Americans.  The NCDH fair housing movement in the urban north was never 
able to gain the same energy and momentum as the southern civil right protest.  One 
explanation for the limited support the NCDH received was the fact that many northern 
African American’s preferred to live in all-black communities.  The idea that African 
American’s possessed better economic opportunities in their own communities flourished 
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in 1966, as the Black Power movement was taking hold in United States cities.  In 
addition, many local African American leaders did not back the integration philosophy of 
the NCDH, because they suspected that moving into white communities would weaken 
their own political strength and economic independence.  The fair housing ideology was 
often out of touch with the interests and desires of the masses in the urban north.  The 
failures of the NCDH stemmed from its refusal to acknowledge the fact that many 
African American’s chose to live with people who shared their skin color.   
The limited level of support for the open housing movement could be clearly seen 
as Martin Luther King, Jr., brought the focus of his non-violent civil rights movement on 
Chicago in 1966.  King decided to move to Chicago in order to draw the attention of the 
nation to the realities of racial segregation and inequality outside of the south.  On 
January 7th, 1966, he formed the Chicago Freedom Movement (CFM), a coalition 
between his Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and local Chicago civil 
rights leaders such as Al Raby.58  The CFM decided to attack segregation in the urban 
north by focusing on the volatile issue of housing discrimination.  To gain the attention of 
Chicago’s political and business leaders, the movement staged a series of open housing 
demonstrations and marches in the summer of 1966.  Because King was a national figure, 
the marches drew major media attention to racial segregation and inequality outside of 
the south.  However, the CFM protest never gained much backing from Chicago’s 
African Americans community because they continued to prefer to live in all-black 
residential areas. 59 
The CFM also failed to grasp the complicated layers of social class amongst 
African American’s in the Chicago metropolitan area.  Differences in income, 
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occupation, and status became manifest in a growing residential segregation of the black 
population of Chicago by class.  Blacks fortunate enough to have the resources fled the 
crowded inner-city, leaving the poor who would continue to bear the brunt of racial and 
class segregation as they were trapped in the city’s worst housing.   
After World War II, the rise of an African American middle-class allowed its 
members to create their own communities in segregated suburbs.  The popular historical 
description of twentieth century suburbanization in the United States all too often 
excludes this group of African Americans suburban homeowners from its story.  Recent 
scholarship of urban historian Andrew Weise reveals that African Americans created 
their own communities in spaces outside of the nation’s cities.  He explained how “spatial 
and social mobility were two sides of the same coin.”  African American’s routinely 
moved out of metropolises as they joined the middle-class.60  However, the class status of 
African American suburbanites’ was always in a precarious position, as their 
neighborhoods were the most vulnerable to encroachment by lower-class, inner-city 
African Americans.  Because of this perceived threat, black suburban homeowners 
constantly fought to keep poorer blacks out in order to insulate themselves and protect 
their economic stability in the post-war period.61 
The divided consciousness of blacks in Chicago restricted mass protest 
mobilizations, created far-ranging disagreements over techniques, and limited the 
movement’s power to achieve its open housing objectives.  The failure of the CFM 
stemmed largely from King and his supporters’ unfamiliarity with Chicago neighborhood 
dynamics.  Chicago was much larger than any urban area that King and the SCLC had 
dealt with in the southern civil rights struggle.  In 1966, the CFM led by King did not 
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fully understand the complicated reasons behind African American settlement patterns in 
the urban north.   Black Power leaders in Chicago rejected the idea of social and 
economic mobility as defined by moving into white neighborhoods.  The integration 
goals of open housing movement were not appealing to most inner-city blacks and the 
popularity of the black isolation philosophy in the late 1960s illustrated this fact.62   
The NCDH and Martin Luther King, Jr. failed to accept that poor blacks wanted 
no part of integrating white suburban communities and middle class blacks wanted no 
part of poor blacks’ problems.  The lofty goals of the open housing movement were 
simply unpopular among most blacks, rich and poor.  While the NCDH and King were 
unable to ignite massive street protests like those in the southern civil rights movement, 
they were however able to influence the passage of some limited fair housing laws during 
the 1960s.  These new federal promises in the form of housing legislation gave the 
NCDH some important new political influence in their struggle to abolish discrimination 
in the nation’s housing markets.  
 
THE FEBRUARY 1967 CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF THE NCDH 
In order to compel the federal government to enforce its earlier nondiscriminatory 
declarations, Wood and Rutledge chose the issue of the Weston site approval to wage an 
all out administrative attack.  The NCDH utilized their 1967 testimony against the atomic 
site selection to block the AEC site selection until Illinois passed enforceable, statewide 
fair housing legislation that covered the private market.  The new federal legislative 
mandates of the 1960s reinforced the legitimacy of their challenge.  If the government’s 
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fair housing promise could be trusted, the NCDH maintained that there was no way that 
the Weston site could be approved. 
By 1966, the NCDH was able to steer the Joint Committee to several legislative 
mandates that were meant to prevent discrimination against racial minorities in search of 
housing.  The NCDH believed the spirit of the executive order and Title VI established 
significant new powers to help open up Chicago’s suburbs.  Wood and Rutledge 
explained that these legislative protections demanded that African Americans could 
participate in and enjoy the benefits of all federal programs.  The legal guarantees of the 
federal government would essentially be meaningless, they argued, if the AEC placed 
their scientific research plant in an area where federal job opportunities were inaccessible 
to racial minorities.63  Wood and Rutledge concluded their testimony by demanding that 
the federal government had a moral responsibility to reject the Weston site unless Illinois 
passed an enforceable fair housing law.     
In the midst of a Cold War with the Soviet Union, the NCDH constantly 
reinforced the idea that the United States held an ethical obligation to block the approval 
of the Weston site construction.  The NCDH argued that if the site were accepted without 
Illinois and Chicago taking any action to open the job and housing market, the United 
States would be sending a message that endorsed racial inequality and segregation.  In 
1966, Kennedy’s Presidential successor Lyndon B. Johnson understood this dilemma and 
he understood the importance of the federal government’s role in taking a progressive 
stance on the issue of fair housing.  Johnson pledged that the 1962 executive order called 
upon the “federal government to undertake action programs to achieve full and equal 
opportunity as a fact in government life.”64  Rutledge underlined Johnson’s word “action” 
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when he demanded that the federal government use its funds to provide equal 
employment opportunities and an open housing market for all citizens.  He warned the 
Joint Committee in his testimony that if this step was ignored then “this nation will have 
forfeited in advance the opportunity to utilize the last remaining land resource in the 
Chicago area to facilitate outward movement and suburbanization of thousands of Negro 
families.”65  Wood also saw the Weston project as a “federal development effort” that 
would create thousands of jobs, homes and businesses.  He maintained that any such 
federal effort should also follow the provisions of Title VI, which prohibited federal 
spending in a racially discriminatory situation.  
In their testimony, Wood and Rutledge continued to stress that the AEC’s site 
selection criteria outlined the importance of the plant’s placement in an area with a 
progressive civil rights record.  Initially, Rutledge praised the AEC policy for setting a 
strong civil rights model for other federal government installations to follow.  In an 
article appearing in the September 1966 issue of the NCDH publication Trends in 
Housing, the organization stated “the AEC is to be commended for requiring an 
outstanding fair housing record as the essential criteria in locating the site.”66  Rutledge 
even hoped that the AEC precedent would encourage other federal agencies to assure that 
equal employment and housing opportunities existed in potential sites for their 
installations.  
When the Weston site was announced Rutledge quickly changed his tone from his 
earlier support of the AEC site selection requirements to adamant disapproval.  He now 
argued that the Weston decision not only “flies in the face of established federal policy, 
but represents a major retreat from the position publicly enunciated by the AEC itself.”67   
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In a 1967 New York Times article, NAACP President Clarence Mitchell asserted that “if 
the AEC had set out to find a site where its colored employees, scientists and visitors 
would be most likely to encounter discrimination in housing, Weston could clearly 
qualify for that dubious honor.”68  The NCDH felt that AEC site selection process must 
have completely ignored its own fair housing requirements since the Weston area was 
notorious its record of racial housing discrimination. 
In order to sway the Joint Committee members from voting to approve the 
Weston site, the NCDH tried to link the decision to the ongoing urban crisis.  The urban 
riots of the 1960s gave the NCDH mission an increased urgency as it was clear that 
something must be done to alleviate the unemployment problems of the inner-city.  
Rutledge threatened that if the Joint Committee approved the Weston site without the 
adoption of Illinois’s fair housing legislation, it would only intensify the problems of 
discrimination and poverty for nearly one million African Americans living in Chicago.  
He argued “the government of all the people should not and must not enter into a 
partnership with suburban communities which deliberately exclude Negro citizens from 
the job and housing market.”69   
During the mid-1960s, politicians and the mass media were extremely concerned 
about the deepening urban crisis in cities like Chicago.  While the northern open housing 
protest did not gain massive support among Chicago’s African Americans, it did attract 
national attention towards the issue of housing discrimination in Chicago.  The question 
of how to deal with the angry and riotous urban crisis was a large part of the national 
political discourse at the same time of the site approval debate in the summer of 1967.  At 
a time when cities were exploding with anger over racial inequality, the issue of the 
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atomic site selection provided the NCDH with an opening to change the federal 
government’s stance on racial housing discrimination in the suburbs.   
The connection between job opportunities and open housing was a significant and 
reoccurring point of Rutledge’s and Wood’s testimony.  According to the NCDH, racial 
housing barriers were canceling out employment opportunities where government 
installations and plants with federal contracts were located.70  The NCDH concluded that 
the problem of urban poverty was intensified by the lack of available open housing close 
to new jobs.  While the NCDH recognized that the unemployment problem of urban 
African Americans came from interrelated causes, they emphasized that “there can be no 
question that the lack of access to suitable housing is a major obstacle in the ghetto 
dweller’s search for a job.”71  The movement of businesses out of the city created a 
spatial chasm between urban African Americans and jobs during the post-war decades.72 
Without Illinois fair housing guarantees, the NCDH warned that the federal 
installation would be just another example of how the federal government continued to 
facilitate patterns of racial housing segregation in white suburbs and African American 
inner cities.  The NCDH tried to persuade the Joint Committee that their decision had the 
potential to affect two critical national issues: unemployment and open housing.  
Rutledge’s testimony demanded that “federal government installations of every 
magnitude and importance should be located only in communities which are committed 
to a policy of and are taking affirmative action toward achieving integration.”73   He went 
on to argue that “If Negroes cannot live or work in the Weston area then their legal right 
to AEC employment is essentially meaningless and without foundation.”74  In Rutledge’s 
opinion the atomic accelerator site could help relieve the depression-level unemployment 
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rates among urban blacks.  With the evidence of suburban Chicago housing 
discrimination and the new federal legislative assurances, Rutledge remained confident 
the Joint Committee would delay the approval of the Weston site.       
 
THE RESULTS OF THE WESTON PROTEST 
The 1967 debate over the atomic site approval represented the larger ongoing 
struggle between civil rights politics and suburban homeowners.  While the NCDH 
gathered enough support and influence to stall the Joint Committee, they ultimately failed 
to gain the majority backing they needed to block the final funding authorization of the 
atomic accelerator.  The NCDH open housing movement was unsuccessful because it 
was never able to garner the same attention and support as the massive civil rights protest 
in southern cities.  While the bureaucratic attack of the NCDH did gain the support of a 
large group of liberal senators, it simply did not gain enough public support to force 
conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats to take its demands seriously.   
In June 1967, the Joint Committee made its final funding recommendations for 
the plant.  The Senate majority report signaled the failure of Wood’s and Rutledge’s 
protest, as it recommended the approval for the initial design and construction of the 
atomic accelerator in Weston.   However, Chairman Pastore submitted a dissenting 
opinion, which echoed the NCDH demands during their February testimony.  His report 
argued that the AEC project be deferred because the approval of the Weston site, would 
only worsen racial tensions that were already exploding in the nation’s cities.  In a 
desperate effort to block the site’s approval, the Rhode Island Senator shouted “this is the 
way you make the summer hotter.”75  Pastore went on to plead to Congress to withhold 
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the final approval of the Weston site by asserting “the soul of man is at stake when his 
dignity is endangered by discrimination.  Let us be done with such inequality.”76  
In the end, Everett Dirksen was able to unite the Republicans with the Southern 
Democrats to defeat the protest of the NCDH and the liberal senators.  Dirksen’s 
persistent attack against the creation of a civil rights precedent in government 
installations ultimately won the favor of the majority of the Joint Committee members.  
Many policymakers feared that their own states would be judged against on a similar 
open housing model in the future.  Furthermore, the senators knew that their suburban 
homeowner constituents would not approve of a vote withholding appointment of a 
federal installation to promote integration.  Suburban homeowners made up a powerful 
and influential “silent majority,” that were capable of strongly influencing domestic 
politics during the late 1960s.  Politicians representing these constituents knew that 
blocking the approval of the atomic site would be committing political suicide.  The 
Weston atomic site approval ultimately suffered from the Joint Committee member’s lack 
of enthusiasm and desire to abolish racial discrimination in Chicago’s housing market.   
On July 12th, 1967, the Weston site was eventually approved by a vote of 47 to 37 
that closely followed political party, as well as suburban/city lines.  Two weeks later 
President Johnson signed the bill and approved the first large funding allotment for the 
atomic accelerator.  However, after signing the bill Johnson wrote a statement regarding 
his own concern over the availability of jobs and housing for the new employees at the 
atomic research plant in Weston.  Holding true to his support of civil rights issues, 
Johnson demanded the AEC take “bold affirmative action” to insure that “Americans of 
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all races should have an opportunity to apply to work, and for housing, in connection 
with this great scientific venture.”77   
While the NCDH failed to influence the final site selection of the AEC, they did 
achieve several limited fair housing victories as a result of their protest.  Their verbal 
attacks against the Weston site influenced the creation of ethical objectives in the 
laboratory itself.  In 1969, the leadership of the national atomic accelerator adopted a 
Policy on Human Rights, which declared their “support of the rights of the members of 
minority groups in our laboratory and in its environs is inextricably intertwined with our 
goal of creating a new center of technical and scientific excellence.”78  The Director of 
the laboratory, Robert Wilson, also created an aggressive affirmative action program 
aimed at employing minorities by setting up training programs for residents of Chicago’s 
ghettos.  The efforts were impressive enough to change the position of Clarence Mitchell 
of the NAACP from his earlier opposition towards support for the laboratory once it was 
open.  
In addition, the Weston protest of the NCDH was somewhat influential on local 
fair housing reforms in the suburbs of DuPage County.  While statewide legislation was 
never achieved, more than 30 communities in the area, including Weston itself, passed 
open housing ordinances by 1968.  The sustained protest of the NCDH for fair housing 
made it impossible for local leaders to ignore the reality of housing discrimination in their 
communities.  During this period the energy and public support behind fair housing 
reform forced a dramatic political shift in local and national politics, which would 
eventually lead to the adoption of a federal fair housing law.   
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THE 1968 FAIR HOUSING ACT 
In 1968, the pressure for statewide open housing legislation in Illinois dissolved 
because of the passage of a national Fair Housing Act, which mandated the abolishment 
of discriminatory housing practices for all Americans.  The legislation also marked a 
significant reordering of federal policy towards housing.79  The national Fair Housing Act 
was immediately hailed by the NCDH as a reversal of a thirty-year pattern in which the 
policies of the federal government actively promoted housing discrimination against 
African Americans.   
For several years, President Lyndon B. Johnson pressured Congress to pass the 
fair housing legislation, but was unable to gather enough support to pass it until 1968.  A 
series of dramatic events occurring in the late 1960s forced Congress to finally 
acknowledge the nation’s increasing social tensions and act to resolve them.  The anti-
discrimination legislation almost certainly would have lacked the necessary support in 
Congress if it were not for two significant historic events that swayed public and political 
opinion.   
One of these events was the 1968 release of a report by a commission headed by 
Illinois’ Governor Otto Kerner.  Johnson appointed the Kerner Commission, in the 
aftermath of the urban riots to better understand crisis occurring in American cities 
during the 1960s.  The conclusions of the Commission warned that the nation was 
“moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal.”  The Kerner 
report recommended that the federal government enact a fair housing law and 
desegregate housing by putting more low-income housing outside central cities.   
  
 
36 
 
 
The other influential event in 1968, and by far the more profound one, was the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4th.  The day after Martin Luther King, 
Jr. was killed, Johnson urged the House to pass the fair housing bill as a tribute to the 
civil rights leader.  He believed that the federal government needed to make a strong 
statement to ease the mounting pressure of the ensuing violent race riots in cities 
throughout the United States.  A week after King was murdered; the House followed the 
President’s recommendation and passed the Senate’s version of the Fair Housing Act.80   
The 1968 Fair Housing Act addressed the first recommendation of the Kerner 
Report, which stated that the federal government should enact a fair housing law.  
However, the Act did not address the second recommendation of the report, which 
recommended the creation of more low-income units outside central cities.  None of the 
language in the Fair Housing Act required that the federal government encourage 
suburban racial integration through the use of subsidized housing.  Nor did the Fair 
Housing Act forbid economic discrimination of any kind or require the government to 
promote suburban economic integration through any means.   
Although the Fair Housing Act was a landmark piece of civil rights legislation, 
contemporary historians have challenged its success at eliminating housing 
discrimination after 1968.  Mechanisms to implement the anti-discrimination law were 
intentionally written out of the Fair Housing Act in order to gain votes from moderate 
Republicans like Everett Dirksen.  The disappointments of the 1968 open housing 
legislation have continued to lead toward the national trend of housing discrimination and 
segregation.  Since the passage of the Fair Housing Act, uneven development has 
  
 
37 
 
 
persisted between the nation’s suburbs and inner-cities in more subversive ways through 
exclusionary zoning and the private market.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In 1965 President Johnson gave the commencement speech at Howard University, 
Jack E. Wood’s Alma Mater.  In his historic speech, Johnson eloquently summarized the 
purpose of the NCDH during Wood’s and Rutledge’s leadership.  
We seek not just freedom but opportunity.  We seek not just legal equity but real 
human ability – not just equality as a right and a theory, but equality as a fact and 
equality as a result.  For the task is to give twenty million Negroes the same 
chance as every other American to learn, grow, to work and share in society, to 
develop their abilities – physical, mental and spiritual and to pursue their 
individual happiness.81  
 
In 1967, Wood and Rutledge saw the opportunity to use the symbolic power of a 
multimillion-dollar scientific laboratory to abolish housing discrimination in the Chicago 
suburbs.  They hoped their influence would force the federal government to make good 
on its earlier legislative promises to create equal opportunities in housing and 
employment in the nation’s cities and suburbs.  With the weight of the AEC’s atomic 
installation, the NCDH believed it had a chance to offer the opportunities of Chicago 
suburbs to African Americans.  Wood and Rutledge were full of hope that a federal 
action could help African American citizens in Chicago realize equal access to a good 
job, a decent home and a strong education for their children.   
In the end, the NCDH’s Weston protest never gathered enough strength to force a 
substantial change in local and federal fair housing policies.  The words and ideas of the 
NCDH failed to capture the hearts and minds of the African American ghetto dwellers, as 
they continued to choose racial solidarity over forced assimilation.  Fair housing 
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advocates also struggled to overcome the political power of suburban white homeowners, 
who remained focused on protecting their property values from black encroachment.  The 
failed attempt of the NCDH in 1967 to reform Illinois’ fair housing legislation illustrates 
the limits of the liberal changes in federal housing policies.   
Ultimately, the NCDH Weston protest was unable to convince Chicago’s African 
Americans, suburban whites, and the federal government to accept the goals of 
integration.  Today we still live with the legacy of the NCDH disappointments in our 
nation’s segregated cities and suburbs.  However, we also live with the hope expressed in 
the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., who declared at the end of the 1967 summer, “that 
the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”82  Jack E. Wood, Jr. 
and Edward Rutledge understood that the arc does not simply bend on its own.  They 
would dedicate their lives to making King’s vision a reality.    
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